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Abstract
Statistical tests on a panel of data from 54 countries over the 2004–2009 period support the proposition that high 
income inequality and entrepreneurial activity share a positive linear relationship. In a novel approach, the dependent 
variable is defined from two independent and uncorrelated perspectives: (1) the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship 
Snapshot, which measures new business entry density based on secondary official sources; and (2) the Total Early Stage 
Entrepreneurial Activity of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor project, which is a survey-based measure of formal and 
informal entrepreneurial participation rates. The empirical strategy is based on the logic that economies with increasing 
concentrations of wealth tend to encourage entrepreneurial activity because entrepreneurs accumulate more income than 
workers. Following the disequalizing model, once this inequality appears, it is reinforced in successive generations. The 
intuition behind this outcome is that a certain level of initial capital is required to establish a new enterprise, which implies 
that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur increases if an individual has inherited wealth.
Keywords: entrepreneurial activity; income inequality; institutions; gini index.
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1. Introduction
The widening development gap among countries is an om-
nipresent and well-documented trend (Kreutzmann, 2008). 
Approximately 80% of the world’s total gross domestic 
product (GDP) belongs to the 1 billion people living in de-
veloped countries, and the remaining 20% is shared by the 5 
billion people living in the developing world. The vast major-
ity of the world’s population is poor. This concentration of 
wealth is a puzzle that has not yet been adequately solved in 
the management literature. In fact, the relationship between 
business creation and wealth remains one of the most un-
derstudied and important issues in the growing field of en-
trepreneurship (Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2012).
The general objective of this paper is to bridge two sub-
disciplines in the respective fields of management and eco-
nomics: entrepreneurship and development economics. 
According to Naudé (2010), entrepreneurship and devel-
opment economics have evolved in relative isolation with 
respect to one another; because development economics 
is the sub-discipline in economics that addresses growth 
and structural change in economies, this gap is a surpris-
ing limitation in the academic literature. Bapuji and Riaz 
(2013) add that management literature requires more em-
pirical work that addresses the linkages between economic 
inequality and management, rather than focusing solely on 
either one in isolation. 
This paper takes a small step toward understanding the ori-
gins of entrepreneurial activity by investigating the extent to 
which income inequality is a determining factor; specifically, 
it asks whether inequalities in income distribution play an 
important role in fostering entrepreneurial activity. I draw 
on panel data from 54 nations for the period 2004-2009 
to test the proposition that the level of income inequality 
affects the rates of entrepreneurial activity across nations. 
Based on cross-country statistical analyses of such panel 
data, I posit that a rise in income inequality increases the 
probability of entrepreneurial activity. As a novel approach, 
I use two indicators for entrepreneurial activity as depend-
ent variables, each of which reflects a different aspect of 
entrepreneurship. 
The results indicate that there is a positive linear relation-
ship among income inequality and the following two inde-
pendent measures of entrepreneurial activity across nations: 
(1) entry density, as derived from the World Bank Group En-
trepreneurship Snapshot (WBGES); and (2) Total Early Stage 
Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), as derived from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project. The results are 
robust to a wide range of macroeconomic, institutional, and 
competitiveness controls.
Entrepreneurs accumulate more income than workers, 
which leads to concentrations of wealth (Quadrini, 1999), 
and also have higher wealth–income ratios and higher saving 
rates than workers. These different saving patterns generate 
higher asset holdings and higher levels of wealth concentra-
tion in the hands of entrepreneurs (Meh, 2005). Moreover, 
previous generations of wealthier families are more likely to 
be characterized by individuals who have engaged in entre-
preneurial activities than the previous generations of other 
families; thus, because the wealth accumulated during busi-
ness periods is generally not depleted immediately, these 
entrepreneurial families have greater resources to start or 
restart businesses (Quadrini, 1999). These features of the 
family dynamics of entrepreneurs further reinforce the in-
tuition that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur 
increases if an individual has inherited wealth because initial 
capital is required to establish new enterprises (Holtz-Eakin 
et al., 1994a; 1994b).   
The findings of this paper complement the arguments of 
Shane (2009) that the typical start-up is not innovative, gen-
erates little wealth, does not make markets more competi-
tive, and creates few jobs. Shane (2009) adds that govern-
ment resources are founding wage-substitution businesses 
that have more in common with self-employment than 
with the creation of high-growth start-ups. The practical 
implications of the findings are grounded in the conceptual 
framework that self-employed individuals at the lower end 
of the distribution are fundamentally different from the self-
employed individuals at the upper end of the distribution 
(Tamvada, 2010). Therefore, “entrepreneurship-supporting 
policies could be particularly successful in reducing inequal-
ity if directed at the low-income, low-wealth, and relatively 
uneducated segments of society” (Kimhi, 2010: 89).
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next 
section presents the theoretical arguments related to the 
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and income 
inequality. I then provide a description of the variables of in-
terest and the sample selection. Next, I define the structural 
factors in entrepreneurial activity and describe a series of 
statistical tests together with their most significant findings. 
The last section concludes with a discussion and suggestions 
for future research, in addition to addressing the main limita-
tions of the study.
2. Theoretical framework
Entrepreneurial activity is frequently considered a key 
source of jobs (Bednarzik, 2000) and economic growth 
(Schumpeter, 1934), even during economic crisis (Kraus et 
al., 2012). However, despite the growing list of beneficial 
consequences, entrepreneurial activity should not be con-
sidered an umbrella policy, mainly because entrepreneurship 
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ing data from the 1981 and 1985 federal individual income 
tax returns of a group of people who received inheritances 
in 1982 and 1983 that includes information about the size 
of their inheritances, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a) found that 
an inheritance of $150,000 increases the probability that an 
individual will continue as a sole proprietor by 1.3 percent-
age points and that the receipts of any surviving enterprise 
increase by almost 20%. Similarly, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994b) 
suggest that a $100,000 inheritance increases the probability 
of making the transition to entrepreneurship from 19.3% to 
22.6%, or 3.3 percentage points.  
Quadrini (1999) reached similar conclusions: in wealthier 
families, individuals who have engaged in business activities 
during previous periods are more common than those who 
have not, and these families have greater resources to re-
start businesses because the wealth accumulated during the 
business period is generally not depleted immediately. Using 
family wealth data for the years 1984 and 1989 from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (an annual national survey 
conducted since 1968 on a sample of more than 4,800 U.S. 
families), Quadrini (1999) concludes that owning a business 
can only be partially financed with external funds, such that 
only those with sufficient personal wealth are able to found 
profitable businesses. These findings support Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1990), who suggest that if owning a substantial 
capital stock is important to starting a business, then those 
who receive a lump sum of capital should have a higher 
probability of success.
Ultimately, because of liquidity constraints, only those entre-
preneurs who have substantial personal financial resources 
will survive and grow in the medium to long run because the 
average entrepreneur cannot borrow sufficiently to attain 
profit-maximizing levels of capital (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a). 
This intuition is consistent with empirical regularities of firm 
size dynamics: smaller firms fail more often than large firms. 
Firms in fact become larger because their exit rates are 
lower (Meh, 2005); thus, the larger the project, the lower its 
probability of receiving bad shocks. Based mainly on these 
arguments, I therefore hypothesize that a rise in income in-
equality increases the probability of entrepreneurial activity.
3. Data definition and sample selection
Dependent Variables
The measure for the first dependent variable (i.e., entrepre-
neurial activity) is from the 2010 dataset of the WBGES. The 
WBGES uses new business entry density to measure entre-
preneurial activity. This measure is calculated as the number 
of newly registered firms as a percentage of the economy’s 
working-age population (15–64 years of age) normalized by 
1,000 for the six-year period from 2004 through 2009 (Klap-
might also be linked to wealth accumulation and distribution 
(Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a, 1994b; Quadrini, 1999; Gentry and 
Hubbard, 1999; Meh, 2005). 
In this study, I contribute to the argument that links entre-
preneurial activity and income inequality by using data in 
the statistical tests that cover a larger sample (54 countries) 
and a more recent period (from 2004 to 2009) than the 
previous literature. Measuring entrepreneurial activity as the 
dependent variable from two independent and uncorrelated 
perspectives is also a novel approach compared with the 
previous literature.    
Disequalizing Model
Three models have essentially tried to explain patterns of 
income inequality. The neutral model suggests that societies 
that begin equal remain equal over the long run. Thus, vari-
ations in the level of development across countries can be 
explained by historical differences in inequality (Galor and 
Zeira, 1993; Ghatak and Jiang, 2002). The equalizing model 
predicts that wealth differences among households tend to 
vanish over the long run because market forces offer a va-
riety of investment options (Becker and Tomes, 1979; Loury, 
1981). In contrast, the disequalizing model argues that, even 
if all households begin equally, the children of such house-
holds must choose occupations that have varying entry 
costs, which results in inequality for the following genera-
tion (Ljungqvist, 1993); once this inequality appears, it tends 
to be reinforced in successive generations (Freeman, 1996). 
The conceptual framework of this paper is based on the dis-
equalizing model because entrepreneurs tend to accumulate 
more income than workers, which encourages concentra-
tions of wealth among entrepreneurs that are difficult to 
reverse. The logic is straightforward. The higher targeted 
wealth-income ratio leads to higher saving rates among en-
terprising households compared with worker households. 
The different saving patterns of entrepreneurs and workers 
in turn result in higher asset holdings and a higher level of 
concentration in the entire distribution of wealth for entre-
preneurs (Meh, 2005: 707). Tamvada (2010) also found pat-
terns of an unequal distribution of income among entrepre-
neurs because those individuals who also hire others have 
the highest returns in terms of consumption, whereas the 
self-employed, i.e., those entrepreneurs who work for them-
selves, have slightly lower returns than salaried employees. 
Liquidity Constraint Argument
Empirical work on the impact of liquidity constraints on the 
decision to become an entrepreneur is grounded in the ar-
gument that initial capital is typically required to establish a 
new enterprise; thus, the probability of becoming an entre-
preneur increases if an individual has inherited wealth. Us-
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world sample was first trimmed to 62 countries and includ-
ed only those countries that appeared in both the GEM and 
the WBGES dataset during the 2004-2009 period. The sec-
ond cut was made because of a lack of data for six countries 
once the macroeconomic variables included in the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) database were used (these vari-
ables are defined in the regression models as “basic effects”). 
These six countries include the following: Bolivia, Guatemala, 
India, and Uganda (lack of unemployment data); Macedonia 
(lack of investment data); and Switzerland (lack of savings 
data). The next cut (Tunisia) reduced the sample to 55 coun-
tries and was made to conform to the use of data from the 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). The final sample num-
ber of 54 countries (shown in Table A2 in the appendix) was 
arrived at by eliminating Algeria, for which data required to 
calculate the Gini coefficient were missing.
4. Structural factors in entrepreneurial activity
Three sources of information are used to measure the struc-
tural factors in entrepreneurial activity: the WEO database 
from the International Monetary Fund, the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGIs) from the World Bank, and the 
GCI from the World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion 
Survey Dataset. (Table 1 at the end of this section presents 
the descriptive statistics of all variables.)
World Economic Outlook (WEO)
The values for the 2004-2009 period from the April 2012 
WEO database are used to measure four basic effect fac-
tors. The first three factors are expected to demonstrate 
a positive relationship with both measures of entrepre-
neurial activity (i.e., WBGES and TEA), whereas the unem-
ployment rate is expected to have a strong negative sign 
(Bednarzik, 2000). 
1. Log GDP per capita: Data are derived by first converting
GDPs in their national currencies to U.S. dollars and then 
dividing by the total applicable population. GDP per capita 
is expressed using logs to avoid giving excessive weight to 
extremely high and low observations.
2. Investment rate: This factor is expressed as the ratio of
total investment in the current local currency to GDP in the 
current local currency. Total investment, or gross capital for-
mation, is the total value of the gross fixed capital formation, 
changes in inventories, and acquisitions, less the disposal of 
valuables for a unit or sector. 
3. Savings rate: This factor is expressed as the ratio of gross
national savings in the current local currency to GDP in the 
current local currency. Gross national savings is gross dis-
posable income less final consumption expenditures after 
taking into account an adjustment for pension funds. 
per and Love, 2010; World Bank, 2010). The second depend-
ent variable comes from the GEM project’s TEA measure-
ment. TEA is the participation rate of working-age individuals 
in the early stages of venture creation (Amorós, 2011). This 
“early stage” work includes “nascent entrepreneurship,” the 
stage that occurs before a new firm is opened, and “own-
ing-managing a new firm,” which includes an additional 42 
months after the start-up date (Bosma et al., 2012: 20).
Although business registration is an official record and the 
TEA rate is an estimate that is based on phone surveys, us-
ing TEA has advantages because it focuses on the person 
and on both formal and informal work (Amorós, 2011). Un-
registered firms that belong to the informal sectors of the 
economy in fact may comprise as much as 80% of the eco-
nomic activity in developing countries (Bosma et al., 2012). 
Thus, including informal entrepreneurship in the measure-
ment of entrepreneurial activity should generate more 
accurate results. Moreover, as has been argued elsewhere 
(Hinojosa-Martínez and Albornoz-Pardo, 2013; Cabana-
Villca et al., 2013), GEM data is a sufficiently valid empirical 
source of information.    
Main independent variable
The focal point of the analysis is income inequality, which can 
be measured accurately by the Gini index, which is a scale 
that measures the degree of inequality in a country’s income 
distribution. The more equal a country’s income distribution 
is, the lower its Gini index, whereas the more unequal a 
country’s income distribution is, the higher its Gini index. If 
income is distributed with perfect equality, the index value 
is zero; if income is distributed with perfect inequality, the 
index value is 100. 
Three secondary sources of information were used as meas-
urements for the Gini index: the Central Intelligence Agency 
World Factbook (CIA - The World Factbook), the United 
Nations Development Programme indicators (UNDP), and 
the United Nations University World Institute for Devel-
opment Economics Research income inequality database 
(UNU-WIDER). The definition and methodology for calcu-
lating the Gini index are practically identical in these three 
sources. In cases in which data were available from more 
than two sources, the average for that period was used (Re-
fer to Table A1 in the appendix.) 
Sample
The sampling technique is probability systematic, in which 
the initial sampling point is selected at random and the cases 
are then selected at regular intervals. The initial sampling 
point is the WBGES dataset of 115 developing and indus-
trial countries for the 2004-2009 period. In the analysis, the 
16
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2014, Volume 9, Issue 1
3. Rule of law: This variable reflects perceptions of the extent
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, particularly with respect to the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, in 
addition to the likelihood of crime and violence.
Global Competitiveness Index
The OECD (1998) report also includes other competitive-
ness issues as potential factors of entrepreneurial activity, 
such as the quality of infrastructure and the availability of 
venture capital. These factors are measured effectively using 
the GCIs (the GCI scores are expressed on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 7, with 7 being the most desirable outcome). The 
GCIs, however, are available only for the 2006–2009 period. 
All GCI variables are expected to have a strong positive 
coefficient except for the number of procedures and days 
required to start a business.
1. Venture capital availability. This indicator asks, “How easy
is it for entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects to 
find venture capital?” [1 = very difficult; 7 = very easy]. 
2. Quality of the educational system. This indicator asks, 
“How well does the educational system in your country 
meet the needs of a competitive economy?” [1 = not well at 
all; 7 = very well].
3. Property rights. This indicator asks, “How would you rate
the protection of property rights, including financial assets, 
in your country?” [1 = very weak; 7 = very strong].
4. Unemployment rate: The unemployment rate is expressed
as the percentage of unemployed workers in the total la-
bor force. As defined by the International Labour Organiza-
tion, unemployed workers are those who are currently not 
working but are willing and able to work for pay and are 
actively searching for work.
Worldwide Governance Indicators  
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (1998), institutions are essential 
for understanding the outcomes observed in entrepreneur-
ship, where institutions are broadly understood as the “rules 
of the game” (Naudé, 2010: 1). However, measuring the um-
brella term “institutions” is a difficult task. I used three WGIs 
for the period 2004–2009. These variables are expected to 
have strong positive coefficients. (WGI scores range from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding 
to better levels of governance.) 
1. Voice and accountability: This variable reflects perceptions
about the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to exercise 
rights involving freedom of expression, freedom of associa-
tion, and a free media. 
2. Political stability and the absence of violence: This variable
reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, which includes politically motivated violence 
and terrorism.





Entrepreneurship Snapshots (WBGES) 298 3.82 4.29 0.09 27.03
Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) 208 8.7% 6.1% 1% 40%
GINI index 185 38.07 10.49 23 67.4
Log GDP per capita 324 4.10 0.48 3.04 4.98
Investment rate 324 23.1% 4.6% 14% 40%
Savings rate 324 22.1% 7.3% -4% 48%
Unemployment rate 324 8.5% 5.1% 1% 31%
Voice & accountability 324 0.64 0.77 -1.22 1.83
Political stability & absence of violence 324 0.24 0.85 -2.20 1.59
Rule of law 324 0.63 0.94 -1.03 2.01
Venture capital availability 215 3.56 0.85 1.96 5.38
Quality of overall infrastructure 215 4.55 1.29 1.97 6.70
Property Rights 215 5.13 1.03 2.78 6.67
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effects models by using the between-regression estimator” 
(StataCorp, 2009: 442). Regressions with between effects are 
equivalent to taking the mean of each variable for each case 
across time and running a regression on the collapsed data-
set of the means. The BE model should be used to control 
for omitted variables that change over time but are con-
stant between cases. This characteristic is typical for cross-
country estimates that explain entrepreneurial activity using 
both the individual and combined effects of macroeconomic 
factors, institutional factors, and competitiveness factors. In 
5. Empirical tests and results
Between-effects (BE) models with the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) option are used in all the specifications. Because the 
p-value of the Hausman test is not significant, the choice 
of fixed-effects models is rejected. BE models estimate the 
cross-sectional information in the data, the fixed-effects 
models use the time-series information in the data, and the 
random-effects estimator is a matrix-weighted average of 
the results from these two models. BE models fit “random-
Table 2. Cross-country results for entrepreneurial activity, panel data 2004-2009. (Between-estimates linear regression models, OLS)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios (White, 1980) in parentheses. 
***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
I II III




cators)WBGES & TEA basic effect
WBGES TEA WBGES TEA WBGES TEA
GINI index
0.11 0.002 0.14 0.001 0.15 0.002
(1.78)* (1.78)* (2.26)** (1.71)* (3.11)*** (1.78)*
Log GDP per capita
4.26 -0.07 0.59 -0.12 2.56 -0.11
(2.97)*** (-3.06)*** (0.24) (-3.29)*** (1.38) (-2.92)***
Investment rate
18.68 -0.017 15.75 0.08 20.45 0.09
(1.55) (-0.11) (1.31) (0.47) (2.60)** -0.56
Savings rate
-19.86 -0.19 -25.19 -0.06 -22.28 -0.06
(-2.24)** (-1.34) (-2.60)** (-0.37) (-3.38)*** (-0.41)
Unemployment rate
-40.19 -0.41 -39.86 -0.43 -23.32 -0.36
(-2.54)** (-2.02)* (-2.60)** (-2.09)** (-2.02)* (-1.61)
Voice & accountability
-1.11 0.04 -1.80 0.03
(-0.85) (1.74)* (-1.87)* (1.53)
Political stability & absence of violence
1.46 -0.01 1.08 -0.01
(1.49) (-1.06) (1.52) (-0.79)
Rule of law
2.01 0.01 1.86 0.01










Adjusted R-squared 35% 42% 45% 48% 62% 53%
N 171 129 171 129 102 83
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regression, the unemployment rate in the TEA specification 
lost significance, which is a typical sign of multicollinearity 
issues. These signs of multicollinearity are similar to the ef-
fect observed with log GDP per capita once the institutional 
indicators entered the WBGES specifications.  
In fact, estimating an individual joint relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and its determining factors is not 
free of a potentially high degree of multicollinearity among 
explanatory variables. The first signs of multicollinearity are 
high pairwise correlations (shown in Table A3 in the appen-
dix). Pairwise correlations between explanatory variables 
are relatively low except for log GDP per capita. More im-
portantly, the low correlations between the Gini index and 
the other predictors might suggest that multicollinearity is 
most likely not a problem for the main variable of interest. 
However, in the strictest sense, high pairwise correlations 
among explanatory variables are frequently unreliable and 
misleading, “for pairwise correlations can be low (suggest-
ing no serious collinearity problems) yet collinearity is sus-
pected because very few t ratios are statistically significant” 
(Guratti and Porter, 2010: 254–255). 
As an alternative to simple pairwise correlations, a few in-
dicators signal the existence of multicollinearity in concrete 
applications. For example, the main variable of interest—the 
Gini index—generates very small changes in the estimated 
regression coefficients when the institutional and competi-
tiveness predictor variables are added. Moreover, I also used 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the entire dataset as 
an indicator of multicollinearity. The VIF values ranged from 
the two lowest, 1.33 (investment rate) and 1.76 (unemploy-
ment rate), to the two highest, 17.89 (rule of law) and 10.30 
(property rights). In theory, when the VIF value is less than 
10, multicollinearity is not a problem. The VIF cutoff value of 
10 was originally suggested by Marquardt (1970, p. 610) and 
was later validated by Marquardt (1987), O’Brien (2007), and 
Mason and Perreault (1991). Once the two problematic var-
iables—“rule of law” and “property rights”—were dropped 
from the equation, the mean VIF decreases from 5.34 to 2.64 
(Gini index VIF scores decreased from 2.32 to 1.77).
Finally, I also ran several regressions that always included 
the Gini index, but I omitted explanatory variables with 
relatively high degrees of collinearity. In this way, I marginally 
controlled for plausible scenarios in which the main inde-
particular, BE models use the variation among countries to 
estimate the effect of the omitted independent variables on 
the two measurements of entrepreneurial activity. In all the 
specifications, the BE models are consistent because the 
panel-level means of the regressors are uncorrelated with 
the panel-specific heterogeneity terms.
Table 2 shows that three factors are clearly the most signifi-
cant. The first is that entrepreneurial activity is consistently 
associated with more income inequality. The estimated coef-
ficients of the income inequality regressor are always sig-
nificant, assuming that classical assumptions hold. However, 
the slope coefficients are relatively small, which implies that 
an improvement (i.e., decrease) in the Gini index score of 
approximately six units is associated with a decrease in the 
registration of approximately one new firm for every 1,000 
working-age adults and with an approximately 1 percent-
age point decrease in the number of working-age individuals 
who engage in some type of entrepreneurial activity (assum-
ing that all other factors affecting entrepreneurial activity are 
held constant). Statistically speaking, the explanatory power 
of income inequality regarding entrepreneurial activity is 
reasonably good as judged by the usual t-test of significance. 
In all statistical tests, I compute robust standard errors for 
which I correct for potential heteroskedasticity and for the 
potential correlation of the error term across observations. 
The negative estimator of the parameter in the TEA speci-
fications, however, does not confirm the underlying theory, 
but this result should not be surprising. In fact, a growing 
stream of research has documented a negative relationship 
between entrepreneurial activity and economic growth in 
developing countries (Van Stel et al., 2005). One explana-
tion for this negative relationship is that the TEA meas-
urement captures both formally and informally registered 
businesses (Bosma et al., 2012). Another explanation is that 
entrepreneurial activity has two drivers (Acs and Amorós, 
2008; Amorós and Cristi, 2008). The first is necessity-driven 
entrepreneurship, which is common in poor countries. The 
second is opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, which is 
common in wealthy countries.
The third significant factor in terms of significance, the un-
employment rate, supports the underlying theory (Bednar-
zik, 2000). As predicted, the WBGES specifications indicate 
that if the unemployment rate decreases by 1 percentage 
point, the median number of newly registered firms per 
1,000 working-age individuals increases by approximately 4 
on average (significant at the 5–10% level). The TEA speci-
fications support these findings; that is, a decrease in the 
unemployment rate by 1 percentage point, ceteris paribus, 
is associated with an increase of less than half a percent-
age point in the average number of working-age adults who 
engage in entrepreneurial behavior. However, it is also no-
table that after the competitiveness indicators entered the 
Interpretations of the empirical results follow the principle of Ock-
ham’s razor to maintain simplicity in the explanations. William Ock-
ham (1285-1349) argues that a complicated explanation should not 
be accepted without good reason and writes as follows: “Frustra 
fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora – It is vain to do with 
more what can be done with less” (Gujarati and Porter, 2010: 27).
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countries and also because the GEM data might present bias 
issues due to their collection from phone surveys. Another 
limitation of studying income inequality and entrepreneurial 
activity is that there might be a problem of reverse causal-
ity. For example, individuals may have a higher tendency to 
report themselves as entrepreneurs out of sheer necessity 
when inequality is high because there are no jobs available 
in the economy.
An interesting extension of the findings presented here 
would be to study the specific conditions required to re-
verse the association between income inequality and entre-
preneurial activity. One research opportunity is to qualita-
tively explore specific cases in which fostering high-growth 
entrepreneurship is accompanied by a positive impact on 
income inequality. Shane (2009) specifically argues that it 
is good public policy to stop subsidizing the formation of 
the typical start-up and instead to focus on the subset of 
businesses with growth potential. Kimhi (2010: 89) also sug-
gested, “entrepreneurship-supporting policies could be par-
ticularly successful in reducing inequality if directed at the 
low-income, low-wealth, and relatively uneducated segments 
of society.” These are relevant issues because high-growth 
entrepreneurship has the potential to raise people out of 
poverty, encourage innovation, create jobs, reduce unem-
ployment, make markets more competitive, and enhance 
economic growth. Finally, future research should focus on 
developing economies because there has been little formal 
investigation of the relationship between entrepreneurship 
and income inequality in developing countries (Naudé, 2010). 
These extensions of this study are left for future research.
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pendent variable might capture the explanatory power of 
similar predictors. In all cases, the Gini index had strong and 
significant positive coefficients in the regression models. For 
example, the first two columns of Table A4, which test multi-
collinearity issues after dropping “rule of law” and “property 
rights,” are plausibly the most robust models, which results 
mainly because the significance is more evenly distributed 
among explanatory variables and the overall fits of the mod-
els report values as high as 73%. 
Although it is possible to alleviate (but never eliminate) po-
tential endogeneity between entrepreneurial activity and its 
explanatory factors, the last two columns of Table A4 ad-
dress issues of endogeneity by lagging all explanatory vari-
ables one year. It is important to note that the endogeneity 
tests do not affect the size or direction of the coefficients. 
Endogeneity tests, however, decrease the number of obser-
vations, which affects the validity of the results, i.e., regarding 
the TEA specifications. Table A4 also confirms venture capi-
tal availability as a significant determining factor of entrepre-
neurial activity, which is logical.
6. Conclusion
Contrary to the mainstream literature that associates en-
trepreneurial activity to overall well-being, this paper spe-
cifically suggests that entrepreneurial activity is associated 
with greater income inequality (within the limitation of a 
world sample of 54 countries). Following the disequalizing 
model, which predicts that income inequality is reinforced 
over successive generations (Freeman, 1996), the arguments 
to support these findings are based on the logic that entre-
preneurs tend to accumulate more income than workers, 
which leads to concentrations of wealth among entrepre-
neurs (Quadrini, 1999). Enterprising households also have 
a higher wealth-income ratio than workers and thus have 
higher saving rates, which leads to higher asset holding in the 
hands of entrepreneurs (Meh, 2005). A higher concentration 
of wealth and higher asset holding, in turn, increases the 
probability among enterprising families of receiving inherited 
wealth (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a; 1994b). In addition, those 
individuals who receive a lump sum of capital should have 
a higher probability of becoming successful entrepreneurs 
because owning a stock of capital is important to starting a 
business (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990). 
The conclusions presented here are subject to a number of 
limitations. First, the Gini coefficients for different countries 
are sometimes calculated using different methods. Some 
coefficients are calculated using expenditures, whereas oth-
ers use revenues (Alesina, Di Tella, MacCulloch, 2004: 2013-
2014). Furthermore, the measurements of the two depend-
ent variables might also be misleading because data based 
on the registration of firms are dubious in highly corrupt 
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Appendixes
Table A1. Gini data
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Table A2. Statistical sample
Note: The information reflects the available data for the average period of 2004–2009. Countries are subdivided in catego-
ries based on the Human Development Index (HDI) value determined by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). Countries are listed in alphabetical order.























Argentina 0.56 13.04 Bosnia & Herz. 0.71 6.73 Dominican Rep. 2.13 18.21
Australia 6.33 12.07 Brazil 2.10 12.75 Egypt 0.13 13.11
Austria 0.64 3.86 Colombia 1.02 23.07 Indonesia 0.17 19.28
Belgium 4.15 3.27 Jamaica 1.12 18.92 Jordan 0.59 14.25
Canada 8.00 8.43 Kazakhstan 2.88 9.36 Morocco 0.98 15.75
Chile 2.18 12.31 Malysia 2.60 7.75 Philippines 0.23 20.44
Croatia 2.95 6.48 Mexico 0.62 8.09 South Africa 1.13 5.90
Czech Rep. 2.53 7.85 Panama 3.04 9.59 Thailand 0.64 20.94
Denmark 6.29 4.81 Peru 2.13 30.58
Finland 3.20 5.63 Romania 5.75 4.34
France 3.14 4.82 Russian Fed. 4.03 3.73
Germany 1.18 4.51 Serbia 2.10 7.02
Greece 0.94 7.42 Turkey 0.99 5.87







Korea, Rep. 1.56 8.50
Latvia 5.88 6.94
Netherlands 2.95 5.41








United Kingdom 9.25 5.90
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per capita -.60* 1
Investments             
rate -.27* -.10 1
Savings  
rate -.14 .11* .18* 1
Unemployment  
rate .31* -.48* -.12* -.46* 1
Voice & account-
ability -.48* .80* -.16* -.19* -.25* 1
Political stability &
absence of violence -.60* .75* .05 .11* -.36* .71* 1
Rule of
law -.62* .87* -.12* .15* -.46* .78* .78* 1
Venture capital avail-
ability -.40* .63* -.02 .37* -.45* .45* .48* .73* 1
Quality of Infrastruc-
ture -.34* .72* -.17* .27* -.43* .50* .62* .84* .68* 1
Property
rights -.28* .73* -.15* .15* -.41* .61* .65* .89* .75* .87* 1
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Table A4. Multiculinearity and Endogeneity tests, panel data 2004-2009. (Between-estimates linear regression models, OLS)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios (White, 1980) in parentheses. 
***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
Endogeneity is alleviated by lagging predictor variables 1 year.
I II III
Dependent Variables: Low Endogeneity test: 
Low multiculinearity
Endogeneity test: 
Whole-setWBGES & TEA multiculinearity
WBGES TEA WBGES TEA WBGES TEA
GINI index
0.12 0.002 0.15 0.004 0.19 0.003
(2.81)*** (1.84)* (2.91)*** (2.97)*** (3.26)*** (2.75)**
Log GDP per capita
2.85 -0.11 2.93 -0.16 2.85 -0.17
(1.56) (-2.98)*** (1.22) (-3.70)*** (1.19) (-3.87)***
Investment rate
19.96 0.09 24.04 0.25 22.24 0.29
(2.56)** (0.58) (2.42)** (1.58) (2.20)** (1.93)*
Savings rate
-20.79 -0.04 -21.58 0.05 -26.06 0.11
(-3.24)*** (-0.31) (-2.89)*** (0.48) (-3.23)*** (0.92)
Unemployment rate
-25.73 -0.36 -22.07 -0.21 -24.14 -0.14
(-2.27)** (-1.71)* (-2.19)** (-1.13) (-2.36)** (-0.71)
Voice & accountability
-1.47 0.04 -1.31 0.04 -2.13 0.07
(-1.70)* (1.98)* (-1.16) (2.07)** (-1.57) (2.70)**
Political stability & absence of violence
1.21 -0.01 1.31 -0.02 0.94 -0.01





2.09 0.01 2.95 0.03 3.14 0.03
(3.02)*** (1.05) (3.26)*** (1.97)* (3.01)*** (2.19)**
Quality of overall infrastructure
-0.33 -0.01 -0.59 0.01 -0.45 0.01




Adjusted R-squared 60% 53% 60% 73% 63% 76%
N 102 83 80 62 80 62
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